The arrival of Marco Rubio to the Secretary of State marks an interesting change in the direction of that entity, from different points of view: the first is the profile of the secretary. Joe Biden’s Antony Blinken, a veteran diplomat and national security advisor, has not had an electoral career like Rubio’s, for whom the secretary of state could be one more step towards the Republican nomination for president in 2028.
Trump’s secretaries of state in his first Administration — Rex Tillerson, a millionaire oil executive without much diplomatic experience, fired and repeatedly insulted by the then president, and Mike Pompeo, a wealthy aerospace industry businessman, who came from the Central Agency of Intelligence (CIA) with military and parliamentary experience as a representative to the House—were not seeking presidential candidacies.
And if it were not for the juggling act that he is going to have to do for a successful management that also does not affect his electoral chances, Rubio’s appointment should give more peace of mind: he is respectful of the institutions, he has experience in the international arena, he has no scandals and know Latin America. His conservative political ideology will be shared by some and not by others, but it is not likely that he will do “crazy things” in his new position. He is not a friend and in fact has been a competitor of Trump; His confirmation by the Senate should pass without difficulties, unlike others more close to the president such as Matt Gaetz, accused of regularly paying for sex, including with a minor, and acquiring and consuming drugs while a member of the House of Representatives, which which led him to decline his nomination for attorney general. Or Peter Hegseth, the controversial nominee for Secretary of Defense, a Fox News commentator, former Army major, with no experience in security policy but a graduate of Harvard and Princeton and a decorated combatant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hegseth was accused of sexual assault in 2017 (which he denies), his excessive drinking on the job, and some question his opposition to women in combat and diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs. English) that he considers have weakened the military forces; Hegseth rather proposes focusing on their “lethality.”
Let’s look at just some of the underlying issues for Rubio in Latin America. The region, except for Mexico because it is a neighbor and Brazil because of its size, is generally—whether we like it or not—irrelevant to the United States. However, Rubio’s origin and his time in the Senate suggest that we will have greater visibility. Having been vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, member of the Foreign Relations Committee, chairman of the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee and the Appropriations (Budget) Committee, gives him a broad understanding of the issues and legislative mechanics, which is crucial to be effective.
American foreign policy passes through the Capitol. It is not enough to convince the executive branch; You always have to do it with Congress as well. The foreign policy priorities in the United States are known by seeing the size of the funds that are allocated when the cause “sells” or the country is friendly, or the size of retaliation, if it is not. Which of the two will be for each in this new phase in which the presence of China, Russia and Iran in Latin America have become a cause for concern, especially with dictatorships such as Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua? What to do with them? And with the partners and friends of the dictatorships in the region?
Rubio said in a debate in Congress last year: “There is no one in the Senate who can give me a lesson on immigration (…) 3.3 million people (…) in the country, 5,000 to 10,000 people a day arriving illegally into the country, that is not immigration. Immigration is a good thing. “Mass migration is a bad thing.” Rubio’s position on this issue has not been static. From the broader policies such as when he presented in the Senate with the bipartisan group called the “Gang of Eight” the immigration system reform project called the Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, which was not approved finally, to more rigid proposals such as those that he will have to defend to maintain his “America First” position. At the same time, he will have to face pressure from immigration hawks, such as Tom Homan, the “border czar,” Stephen Miller, the White House deputy chief of staff for policy, and Kristi Noem, the secretary of Homeland Security, who They will seek to achieve the mass deportations that Trump has proposed. Rubio will have to find the exact measure that responds sufficiently to the measures that his boss-president wants, without becoming the owner of those and other drastic measures that could be implemented.
Another concern of the Trump Administration is the presence of China in Latin America. Rubio said in 2022 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “unfortunately, many of these new leaders in the region have expressed admiration for the model of the Communist Party of China, even while turning a blind eye and, in many cases, supporting the regimes that are causing tremendous suffering in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.” This is in line with Trump’s concern about China’s presence in Panama and its influence over the canal and the region in general. While it is understandable that Washington is concerned about the interference of its global arch-enemy in a route as important as the canal, diplomacy and not aggression should be more advisable paths. How will Rubio handle the issue?
Donald Trump and his most loyal allies seem to believe that the influence of the United States in the world will be achieved through impositions and threats, but it is doubtful that, while China advances its global agenda with pockets full of money and cooperation, the rest countries ignore it, especially if Washington makes their lives more difficult.
What to do with Venezuela? The possibility of military actions against that country seemed far from reality, at least in principle. However, there are more and more voices, in Latin America and the United States, that support this alternative. The invasions are of many degrees, from the total occupation of the country to the simple military blockade, which forces the dictator to leave. Except for some of its allies in the region, no one has any doubt that the Venezuelan regime is de facto and that Maduro’s presidency took place outside the law. There is no doubt about the electoral results and that Maduro took power to continue ruling by force. Should we respond to a regime de facto with measurements de facto? Justifying an invasion by executive decision would be viable if it falls – for example – within the budgets of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF, 2001) against countries that support terrorism or other measures. Maduro and his allies already have accusations of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism and even a reward on their heads, so the line is very thin. As analyst Bret Stephens says, by coercive diplomacy if possible, or by force if necessary. What would be the position of countries with which Maduro has worked to strengthen ties, such as China, Russia and Iran? Which exit will Rubio support?
However, the intrinsic complexity of all the issues that Marco Rubio has on his plate is just the beginning, including vis-à-vis his home country, Cuba. The real juggling act will have to be done to resolve the diplomatic problems that the president himself will create around the world, his new best friend Elon Musk through X, Mauricio Claver Carone (Trump’s new special envoy for Latin America), Stephen Miller, Tom Homan and Kristi Noem, and that’s just when it comes to Latin America.
Rubio’s bet is not minor. He has the ability and experience to be a good Secretary of State, but he has too many cooks in the kitchen and too many pressure cookers that, if he does not manage them very well, will end up scorching his presidential aspirations.
